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Stackelberg duopolists are thus seen to be correct when adopting apparently inconsistent conjectural variations! We also give an algorithm to compute, given any sustainable market situation (ql, q2), conjectural variations functions which make this market situation a locally rational conjectural equilibrium. The paper is organized as follows. In section I we first indicate why the traditional formulation of the conjectural variation duopoly models seems implausibly restrictive and we proceed to reformulate those models in a more acceptable framework. In section II we show in the simple framework of a linear model how some classical situations (Cournot [5] , Stackelberg [14] ) can appear as rational conjectural equilibria. In section III, the general algorithm is given. In the conclusion we discuss the implications of the results and give suggestions for future work. Provided the higher order conditions are fulfilled, any pair (q*, ql), solution of this system, is a local equilibrium. In these first order conditions the term (dqildqj)C is the reaction of firm i, conjectured by firmj, to a variation of firm j's own production level. In the usual duopoly models these terms are assumed constant. Clearly, it is not a very plausible assumption but let us proceed with it and suppose that (dqildqj)c = cxj, and (dqj/dqi)C =ai One may wonder: what would firm j observe if it were to change slightly its production level from its equilibrium level? Firm i would react in order to reach a point of maximum profit given the new production level of firm j. This reaction must then satisfy: But one may rightly ask why the conjectural variation should be a constant? It seems that the conjectures formed by the firms should take into account and depend on the characteristics of the situation including the production levels of the two firms, qi and qj. A priori many functional forms could be specified, but the simpler one is the linear form:
It is difficult a priori to accept that the conjectural variation formed by firm i would be constant or independent of either its own production level qi or its competitor's production level qj. Since the linear form (6) ) l2
Let us now consider the following problem: given a pair (ql, q2) > 0, is it possible to find linear conjectural variation functions such that this pair could be a consistent conjectural equilibrium? Clearly what is to be found are the six values oci, !li, yi, cj, ,/j, yj of (6) satisfying a non linear system of four equations, the two first order equations (7) and the two consistent conjectures equations (8), and two inequalities stemming from the second order conditions. Once (^, q2) is given, all the elements of this system are taking given values except for oa, /1l, y1 and a2, Y2, P2. Boyer and Moreaux [1] , and [2] have shown that such values exist, under very weak assumptions. In the next section we give three examples of classical duopoly models which are generally qualified as inconsistent but which can be seen to be locally consistent with proper linear conjectural variations functions. In the following section, we present an algorithm which can be used to generate any such case. We can now give the algorithm in 6 steps.
II. THREE EXAMPLES OF CONSISTENT
Step 1: Given (ql, q2) > 0, P(Q), Cl(q1), C2(q2) compute P, P, P", C', C', C2, C2' and check that P(Q)qi > Ci(qi) for i = 1, 2.
Step 2: Check if the following conditions are met [C1 -P -q,P'][C2 -P -q2 P] # (P')2 qq2
If not, the algorithm may not work.
Step 3 Step 4: Choose any f3i, f2 such that, for i = 1, 2 Di Bi -< Bi and pli 0 Ei
Step 5 Step 6: Write the conjectural variation functions )= ai + pi qi + yiq; i,j1, 2 and i #j which will make the pair (ql, q2) we started with a rational conjectural equilibrium.
The formal theorems and proofs on which the algorithm is based can be found in Boyer and Moreaux [2] . It is clear from step 4 that there exists a whole class of conjectural variation functions, one for each value of (A31, /2). Each pair of functions so obtained will give the same reaction function, they will lead to the same solution and the equilibrium will always be consistent.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have illustrated in this paper that any pair of production levels (ql, q2) which might or might not be the equilibrium solution to some duopoly model with constant conjectural variations can be obtained as a rational conjectural equilibrium for appropriately defined conjectural variation functions. We gave 3 examples and also a general procedure to generate such rational conjectural equilibria.
We also observed that, for the three examples given, a reinterpretation of the constant conjectural variation model was possible. For the case of the Cournot duopoly model with zero conjectural variations we noted that although this model is inconsistent-since at the equilibrium the conjectures are not validated by the best reply or reaction strategy of the duopolistsit is the case that the values of the duopolists' conjectural variation functions-which make the Cournot's quantities a rational conjectural equilibrium-are both 0 at the equilibrium. Therefore, the zero conjectural variation model of Cournot is in a sense a rational conjectural equilibrium since there exists a pair of conjectural variation functions making the Cournot solution a rational conjectural equilibrium and whose values at the equilibrium are 0. Therefore, it is correct for the duopolists to use 0 as conjectural variations at the Cournot equilibrium. But in differentiating the necessary condition for profit maximization to find the slope of the reaction function, one must be careful not to consider that the conjectures are zero identically. In other words, by properly differentiating Cournot's reaction function it turns out that the slope of the reaction function is effectively 0 at the equilibrium. In that sense, Cournot's duopoly model is consistent and rational. A similar analysis holds for the other constant conjectures models.
It is worth noting also that restricting our attention to conjectural variation functions of the linear form (6) has no cost in terms of generality. Every model of duopoly based on conjectural variations can be rationalized through appropriately defined linear conjectural functions.
These results suggest that the requirement of consistency in conjectural models of duopoly allows a reinterpretation in terms of local conjectures which makes the usual constant conjectures consistent. It does not however restrict the duopoly solutions which can be theoretically sound. The restrictions obtained by Bresnahan, Perry, Kamien and Schwartz, Ulph and the others come from somewhat misspecified models whose basic elements are difficult to justify on rational grounds. It seems to us that the research effort should now deal with the origins, development and dynamics of the conjectures themselves to lift the arbitrariness which the consistency requirement has not eliminated.
MARCEL BOYER,

